Book Reviews III: Descartes, Godwin, Kant, Locke, Rousseau

An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice by William Godwin
The Social Contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau
Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant
Meditations on First Philosophy by Renes Descartes
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke

 
An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice
By William Godwin

Government is a contrivance issued for the security of individuals.
An education can give individuals a moral and intellectual improvement.
The subject of legislation is every where the same: man.
Questions whether we have the same senses, the same inlets of pleasure and pain, the same faculty to reason, to judge and to infer. The same causes that make me happy make you happy. A wise superintendent of affairs would pay steady attention to this.
In discussion of an issue, truth must always prove the successful champion.
"Human affairs are admirably harmonized and adapted to each other."
"Whatever limits truth is error."
"Man is a creature of habit. Gradual improvement is a most conspicuous law of his nature."
Chapter IV - Of the Cultivation of Truth - "No man can love virtue and truth sufficiently, who has not an acute and lively perception of its beauty, and its tendency to produce happiness."
Knowledge can produce happiness.
All human knowledge is the result of perception.
Gives the analogy that the poor in one country are more educated than the rich in another country.
In the life of every human being there is a chain of causes, from his birth, through the whole period of his existence.
Is man a passive or an active being?
Since there is a chain of causes in the life of every human being, it follows that the human mind is a system of mechanism.
Consider whether the mind can ever have more than one thought at any one time. Gives the example of reading, where we appear to take in whole words and clusters of words by a single act.
It seems then that the mind can apprehend only a single idea at once. Then discusses simple ideas and apprehending two or more objects at a single effort.
In the case of two ideas, illustrates the mistake of supposing that there is a real interval between the two ideas.
Then discusses the nature of memory.
Suggests that the mind is very subtle in its operations.
Goes on to discuss intellectual and physical actions.
To all these negative advantages of virtue, we may add the positive satisfaction of a mind conscious of rectitude, rejoicing in the good of the whole, and perpetually exerted for the promotion of that good.
Virtue not only leads to the happiness of him who practices it, but to the esteem and affection of others.
It is an inevitable law of our nature, that we should in a great measure judge of others by ourselves.
Whether virtue be the best road to esteem.
Which [man] is most likely to succeed?
Men feel the advantage of dealing with the person upon whom they can depend.
Ability may be almost equally requisite; but ability and virtue, will at least by no person be thought exclusive of each other.
Whether honesty be the best road to success.
"Men cannot do more than declare and interpret law."
Discusses the education of monarchs. Gives examples of former monarchs and the experiences that shaped them.
What is the education of a prince? Its first quality is extreme tact. As he is heir to a throne, it also includes those about him, who play a supporting part. Their success is always uppermost in their minds, at the same time they are anxious to appear altruistic.
Suggests that "we are not to fix our mind upon prodigies, but to think of the species as it is usually found."
Suggests that education is lifelong.
Often, a ruler is obliged to act in the dark, to derive his knowledge from other men's information, and to execute his behests by other men's instrumentality.
No man is entirely ignorant of the nature of man.
In one chapter writes, "the individual is, unfitted by his education to become either respectable or useful."
Of a principle of justice, suggests that no man can be distinguished but by his personal merit.
Issues the question, "what change has my old friend undergone; in what way is he wiser or better, happier or more honorable?"
Is not truth the single vehicle of justice?
Chapter XIV - General Features of a Democracy
Democracy is a system of government according to which every member of society is considered a man and nothing more.
Every man is regarded as equal.
Discusses the steady and uniform operation of fixed principles and the characteristic of a democracy to be wavering and inconstant.
Briefly discusses political justice.
Mentions that no form of government can be devised which does not partake of monarchy, aristocracy or democracy.
Athens was perhaps the most illustrious and enviable spectacle than all the monarchies and aristocracies that ever existed. In addition to a fondness for virtue and independence, the people displayed such incredible achievements, such exquisite refinement, in the midst of whom grew up the greatest poets, the noblest artists, the most finished orators and political writers, and the most disinterested philosophers the world ever saw.
The road to the improvement of mankind is in the utmost degree simple, to speak and act the truth.
Nothing can be more certain than the omnipotence of truth.
The discussion of national affairs is brought before persons of superior education and wisdom.
Benefit by every practicable mode man wherever he exists.
The first principle in government is the necessity of having some man or body of men to act on the part of the whole. Wherever government subsists, the authority of the individual must be in some degree superseded.
Representation has this benefit, to call upon the most enlightened part of the nation to deliberate for the whole.
How shall a nation be governed? By improving the institutions of any people, by enlightening their understandings.
Mentions instances where the functions of ministers and magistrates, do not relate to any particular topic, exclusive of the representative assembly.
Suggests that we recognize our potential as human beings lest we fall short of which our nature is capable. Also commends him who contributes to the society.
Do not men always act in the manner which they esteem best upon the whole or most conducive to their character?
They are encouraged to study and to thirst after knowledge.
The most eminent of the Greek philosophers were in reality distinguished from all other teachers, by the fortitude with which they conformed to the precepts they taught.
The cultivation of the understanding has no tendency to corrupt the heart. A man who should possess all the science of Newton and all the genius of Shakespeare, would not on that account be a bad man.
Governments, no more than individual men, are capable of making mistakes or being wrong.
Discusses oaths of office and duty.
Discusses being logical and not eloquent in speech.



The Social Contract
By Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Book II - The oldest of all societies is that of the family.
VII - The Sovereign
The act of association consists of a reciprocal commitment between society and the individual.
No one can injure any one of the members without attacking the whole. Duty and self-interest thus equally oblige the two contracting parties to give each other mutual aid, and all the advantages that flow from it.
As the sovereign is formed entirely of the individuals who compose it, it has not, nor could it have, any interest contrary to theirs.
VIII - Civil Society
The passing of the state of nature to the civil society produces a remarkable change in man; it puts justice as a rule of conduct in the place of instinct, and gives his actions the moral quality they previously lacked; and man finds himself compelled to act on other principles, and to consult his reason rather than study his inclinations.
And although in civil society man surrenders some of the advantages that belong to the state of nature, he gains in return far greater ones; his faculties are so exercised and developed, his mind so enlarged, his sentiments so ennobled, and his whole spirit so elevated that...
What man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and the absolute right to anything that tempts him and that he can take; what he gains by the social contract is civil liberty and the legal right of property in what he possesses.
The sovereign may not impose on the subjects any burden which is not necessary to the community.
These commitments are obligatory because they are mutual, and a man cannot work for others without at the same time working for himself.
The wise lawgiver begins not by laying down laws good in themselves, but by finding out whether the people for whom the laws are intended is able to support them.
Such reasoning led Plato to refuse to provide laws for the Arcadians or the Cyreneans, because he well knew that those peoples, being rich, would not tolerate equality.
Crete, too, provides an example of good laws and bad men, for the people Milos tried to discipline were dominated by their vices.
Government becomes more burdensome as its area is enlarged, for each town has its own administration, which the people also pays for, then each province has one, and so on up to the greater governments; and then on top of all comes the supreme administration, bearing down on everyone.
Such a great number of charges added to charges continually exhausts the subjects; and they are much worse off than they would be if they had only one administration over them.
At the same time the people has less affection for governors whom it never sees, for a homeland that seems as vast as the world, and for fellow-citizens who are mostly strangers.
Having different laws only creates misunderstanding and confusion among peoples who live under the same government. Talents are hidden and virtues are ignored.
A strong and healthy constitution is the first thing to look for.
There are two ways of measuring a body politic, by the extent of its territory and by the number of its people; and there must be a balance between these two dimensions if the state is to achieve its best size.
The right balance requires that there be land enough to feed the inhabitants and as many inhabitants as the land can feed.
The ideal people are a people without deep-rooted customs or superstitions; one which does not fear sudden invasion; a people in which every member may be known to all; where there is no need to burden a man with more than he can bear; one which is neither rich nor poor; and lastly one that combines the cohesion of an ancient people with the malleability of a new one.
We shall find that the greatest system of law comes down to two main objects, freedom and equality.
Suppose you have rich plains and fertile slopes, good land too little inhabited. Then concentrate on agriculture, to increase the population, and eschew artisanry, which invariably depopulates the countryside and brings the few inhabitants there are together in certain urban centers. Have you a long and convenient coastline? Then fill the sea with ships, develop trade and navigation, and you will have a brilliant if short existence.
The author of L'Esprit des lois has shown with scores of examples how the art of the lawgiver directs the constitution towards each of its ends. Close observance of conventions that natural relations and laws come to be in harmony.
Book II
Every free action has two causes which concur to produce it, one moral - the will which determines the act, the other physical - the strength which executes it.
What then is government? An intermediary body established between the subjects and the sovereign for their mutual communication, a body charged with the execution of the laws and the maintenance of freedom, both civil and political.
The members of this body are called magistrates or kings, that is to say governors.
The government receives from the sovereign the orders which it gives to the people.
Chapter 3 - Classification of Governments
The sovereign must put the government in the hands of the whole people, or of the greater part of the people, so that there are more citizen-magistrates than there are ordinary private citizens. This form of government is known as a democracy.
Alternatively, the sovereign may confine the government to the hands of a few, so that there are more ordinary citizens than there are magistrates: this form of government is called aristocracy.
The sovereign may concentrate the entire government in the hands of one single magistrate, from whom all the others will derive their power. This is the most common, and is called monarchy or royal government. In a monarchy power is being held in the hands of a natural person, such a man is known as a monarch or king.
Throughout the ages men have debated the question 'What is the best form of government?' and yet they have failed to see that each of the possible forms is the best in some cases and the worst in others.
Book II Chapter VII - The Censorial Tribunal
Reform the opinions of men, and their morals will be purified of themselves.
VIII - The Civil Religion
At first men had no kings but the Gods, and their only government was theocratic.
If it is asked why under paganism, there were no wars of religion, I answer that it was due to the fact that each state did not distinguish between its Gods and its laws. Political war was just as much theological war; the provinces of the Gods were determined, by the frontiers of nations.
Religion can be divided into two categories, the religion of man and the religion of the citizen. The first, without temples, altars or rituals, and limited to inward devotion to the supreme God and the eternal obligations of morality.



Critique of Pure Reason
By Immanuel Kant

Critique of Pure Reason
Discusses space and time.
Mentions that "time is nothing but the form of inner sense, that is, of our intuition of ourselves, and of our inner state. And we try to make up for the deficiency of time by means of analogies."
Time has objective validity with respect to our senses, and how we speak of things in general.
"Space, as the pure form of all outer intuition, is restricted, as an a priori condition, to just outer appearances."
"Time has subjective reality with regard to inner experience"
"Concepts of space and time are merely creatures of our imagination."
"All our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance."
He briefly discusses sensation.
Transcendental Logic
Kant in his Critique suggests that in analysis the elements belong not to intuition and sensibility, but to thought and understanding, and that the concepts be elementary.
"Pure understanding distinguishes itself not merely from all that is empirical, but even from all sensibility.”
This knowledge constitutes the sum total of a system.
These concepts allow us to follow an almost mechanical procedure.
This is known as transcendental philosophy.
Mentions that with regard to the modality of judgements, there are limitative and problematic judgements.
Writes that space and time belong to the conditions of the receptivity of our mind.
Defines synthesis as the act of putting different representations together, and of comprehending their manifoldness in one item of knowledge.
"Knowledge is first produced by the synthesis of a manifold. This knowledge may at first be crude and confused and hence in need of analysis, yet synthesis is what really gathers the elements for knowledge and unifies them into a certain content.”
"Synthesis is the mere result of the faculty of imagination.”
Then this synthesis is brought to concepts.
"In this treatise I intentionally omit the definitions of these categories.”
Questions what the origin of our representations may be.
To think an object is not the same as to know an object.
Consequently suggests the application of knowledge to empirical intuition and empirical knowledge.
Describes the non-sensible assumption of an object.
"Imagination is the faculty of representing an object in intuition without its presence.”
"Appearances are only representations of things that are unknown as to what they may be in themselves.”
"All change of appearances is only alteration.”
Suggests that categories by themselves are not knowledge, but mere forms of thought.
Quotes Plato in saying, that in a perfect state no punishments at all would be required.
"Although this perfect state may never be realized, the idea is quite correct which sets up this archetype in order to bring the legal constitutions of mankind closer and closer to the greatest possible perfection.”
Discusses ideas that are, with the full approval of the public at large.”
Mentions that negative judgments do not enjoy a very high reputation among people with a desire for knowledge.
Suggests that the more the branches of government are in harmony with each other the better the society will become.


Meditations on First Philosophy
By Rene Descartes

Discusses his discovery of the Cogito (‘I think, therefore I am,’ or ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’) as a first principle for his new philosophy; the conclusion from the Cogito that he is, essentially, a thinking thing, a soul entirely distinct from the body; and the generalization that whatever we clearly and distinctly conceive is true.
"Subsequent investigations in geometry reinforce the lesson that certainty depends on clear and distinct conception.”
”In producing a philosophy that made the existence of God and the immateriality of the soul certain, Descartes was not simply laying foundations for science: he could claim to be serving religion by depriving unbelief of any claim to rational justification.”
”All these arguments have historical relevance and plausibility.”
Letter of Dedication
Attempts to resolve issues of God and the soul by philosophical rather than theological means.
Mentions that many Christian’s believe that the human soul does not perish with the body and that God exists.
“God’s existence can be proved by natural reason, and that the holy scriptures imply that the knowledge of him is easier to attain than that of many created things; so easy, in fact, that those who lack it do so by their own fault.”
He proceeds to quote Wisdom 13.
Establishes a concept of the soul that is as clear as possible, and entirely distinct from any concept of the body.”
"These points are sufficient to show that the corruption of the body does not cause the mind to perish, and that mortals may have hope of another life.”
"The idea we possess of a supremely perfect being has so much objective reality that it can derive only from a supremely perfect cause.”
First Meditation
Of people who deceive us writes, “although they sometimes deceive us about things that are little, or rather a long way away, there are plenty of other things of which there is clearly no doubt, although it was from the senses that we learned them: for instance, that I am now here, sitting by the fire, wrapped in a warm winter gown, handling this paper, and suchlike.
Indeed, that these hands themselves, and this whole body are mine—what reason could I have for doubting this?
"While general things may be imaginary, at least some other still more simple and universal realities must exist.”
Suggests that the sky, the air, the earth, colors, shapes, sounds, and all external things are no different from the illusions of our dreams, and are traps he has laid for my credulity; I will consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, and no senses.
Second Meditation: Of the Nature of the Human Mind; That it is More Easily Known than the Body
"I will struggle on, and I shall pursue my way until I discover something certain; or discover that it is certain only that nothing is certain.”
“In fact I have no senses at all; body, shape, extension in space, motion and place itself are all illusions. What truth then is left? Perhaps this alone, that nothing is certain.”
Did I also convince myself that I did not exist also? No: certainly I did exist— but there is some deceiver, supremely powerful and cunning, who is deliberately deceiving me all the time.”
”But he will never bring it about that I should be nothing as long as I think I am something.”
”I can finally decide that this proposition, ‘I am, I exist’, whenever it is uttered by me, or conceived in the mind, is necessarily true.”
”That I have a face, hands, arms, and this whole mechanism of limbs, this I referred to as the body.”
”Next, that I took nourishment, moved, perceived with my senses, and thought; these actions I attributed to the soul.”
”What this soul was, however, either I never considered, or I imagined it as something very rarefied and subtle, like a wind, or fire, or thin air, infused into my coarser parts.”
”But about the body itself, I had no doubts, but I thought I distinctly knew its nature.”
”But what about now, when I am supposing that some deceiver, who is supremely powerful and, if I may venture to say so, evil, has been trying to deceive me in every way? It would be a waste of effort to go through the list again.
I am, I exist, this is certain. But for how long? Certainly only for as long as I am thinking; for perhaps if I were to cease from all thinking it might also come to pass that I might immediately cease altogether to exist.
Suggests that a mind, or a soul, or an intellect, or a reason, are all similar words.
I am therefore a true thing: one that thinks.
Third Meditation - Of God, that He Exists
As far as ideas are concerned, if [I] do not connect them with anything outside themselves, they cannot, strictly speaking, be false.
Of these ideas, some are innate, others adventitious, others produced by myself.
Suggests you only think noble thoughts, and writes, “besides, experience shows me that they do not depend on my own will, and therefore do not depend on myself. For they often intrude upon me against my will.”
Writes, “by the same token, the idea by which I conceive a supreme God, eternal, infinite, omniscient, all-powerful, and the creator of all things that exist beside himself, certainly has more objective reality in itself than those by which finite substances are represented.”
Discusses gradually increasing knowledge and the many things in potentiality that are not yet so in actuality.
Proves that God exists, and suggests that we examine what this means.
"We should not look at any one creature in isolation, but at the whole universe of things, whenever we are inquiring whether God’s works are perfect.”
Fifth Meditation - Of the Essence of Material Things; and Again of God, That He Exists
”There remain many attributes of God, and many aspects of the nature of myself for me to investigate.”
”However, even if I can no more think of God without existence than I can think of a mountain without a valley.”
”My nature, that when I first discover them I do not seem to be learning anything new, but rather to be remembering something I knew before, or to be noticing for the first time something that was in me already.”
We can assume that God “has existed from all eternity up to now, and will continue to exist for an eternity in the future.”
Sixth Meditation - Of the Existence of Material Things, and the Real Distinction Between Mind and Body
Mentions that the power of understanding is not crucial to the essence of his mind.
"The mind turns itself in some way towards itself, and gazes on one of the ideas that are contained within itself; but while it imagines, it turns itself towards the body."
"First of all then, I had the sensation of having a head, hands, feet, and all the other parts comprising this body..."
"Then I had the sensation of this body as situated among many other bodies by which it could be affected."
"I also had the sensation of hunger, thirst, propensities, to joy, to sadness, and other such passions."
Discusses external and internal senses.
"Although sense-perceptions do not depend on my will, perhaps there might be some faculty within me that produces them."
"Now, however, that I begin to know myself and the author of my existence rather better, I do not think it should all be called in doubt."
"Moreover, I find in myself faculties of thinking in various specific ways."
"Nature teaches me through the senses, that I am not present in my body only as a pilot is present in a ship, but that I am very closely conjoined to it, and fused with it, so as to form a single entity with it."
"For otherwise, when the body is injured, I would not feel pain as a result, but would perceive the injury purely intellectually."
"But yet we do quite frequently go astray even in things to which we are impelled by nature."
"And I can consider the human body as a kind of machine made up of bones, nerves, muscles, veins, blood, and skin so fitted together that, even if there were no mind within it, it would still have all the movements it currently has that do not result from the command of the will.
"Next, I observe that the mind is not affected immediately by all the parts of the body, but only by the brain, or perhaps only by one very small part of the brain."
"Whenever this part is affected the same way, it represents the same thing to the mind."
Equates movements of the body with points A, B, C, and D.
Discusses sleeping, and writes, "if, while I was awake, someone suddenly appeared before me, and then immediately disappeared, as happens in dreams, I would not unreasonably judge it to be an apparition or a delusion, rather than a real person."
The Objections and Replies
"Required Descartes to clarify his statements."
Second Replies:
1. How do you know a body cannot think?
2. Whether all knowledge depends on the knowledge of God's existence.
Readers should carefully weight the proposition such as "That a thing cannot both be and not be at one and the same time."
"That they should examine the ideas of different natures in which a simultaneous combination of many different attributes is contained, such as the nature of a triangle, or of a square, or any other shape; and also, the nature of mind, the nature of body, and above all the nature of God, or the supremely perfect being."
"That they should devote considerable time to serious contemplation of the nature of the supremely perfect being; and consider, that possible existence is contained in the ideas of all other natures whatsoever."
"They should accustom themselves to distinguishing things that are clearly known from those that are obscure; for this is learned more easily by examples than by rules."
Axioms and Notions
Nothing exists of which we cannot ask what is the cause of its existence.
The present moment does not depend on the moment immediately preceding, and therefore the conservation of a thing requires a cause no less than its original bringing into being.
No thing can have nothing, or a non-existent thing, as the cause of its existence.
Whatever reality or perfection there is in any thing exists formally in its first and adequate cause.
Hence it follows that the objective reality of our ideas requires a cause.
There are different degrees of reality or being.
It is a greater thing to conserve a substance than to create or conserve the attributes or properties of a substance.
Existence is contained in the idea or concept of every thing.
Third Objections
When I think of a human being, I recognize an idea. When I think of a chimera, I recognize an idea. But when someone is thinking of an angel, there comes to mind sometimes the image of a flame, sometimes that of a boy with wings. But believing that there are immaterial and invisible creatures that wait upon God, we attach the name angel.
The same is true of the holy name of God of whom we have no image or idea; and therefore we are forbidden to worship God in the form of an image.
Considering the attributes of God, for by the name of God I mean a substance; that is infinite; that is independent. Supremely intelligent, supremely powerful, creator of all that exists.
For a thing to have accurate knowledge, its knowledge would have to match the infinite power of God; which is clearly impossible.
Fourth Objections and Replies
This becomes clear in the words that follow: Moreover, I find in myself faculties, etc.
For I did not say that those faculties were things, but took care to distinguish them from things or substances.
I think I have taken sufficient care to forestall the conclusion that man is nothing but a soul using a body.
Moreover, that there can be nothing in the mind, in so far as it is a thinking thing, of which it is not conscious.
Fifth Objection and Replies
The eye sees other things, but not itself.
What you should have been investigating and deciding was not that you are a thinking thing, but what kind of thing you are that thinks.
The distinction between yourself and your body. I am willing to deal with you, by considering you, indeed, purely. But I will rather consider you, as you yourself would like to be considered, as a special kind of intellect, in command of the body.
You are right to think of yourself as closely conjoined with your body.
You hesitate as to whether I believe the soul is always thinking.
Your examples of the impossibility of reflexive action are faulty. It is not the eye that sees the mirror rather than itself, but the mind that sees the eye, and the mirror, and itself.
Reminds us that existence of God has a different relationship to essence than the nature of a geometrical figure.
Sixth Objections
Reminds us that there are some bodies that do not think; or rather that some bodies can exist without thought.
Clear and distinct perception puts an end to doubt and skepticism—but the best preparation for it is to renounce one’s former opinions.



An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
By John Locke

In "Essay," first published in 1690, John Locke provides a complete account of how we acquire mathematical, natural, scientific, religious and ethical knowledge.
Book I: Of Innate Notions - Chapter I: Introduction
1. Since it is the understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, it is a subject worth our labor to inquire into.
2. I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind; or trouble myself to examine, wherein its essence consists, or by what motions our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have sensations by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings...
3. It is worthwhile, to search out the bounds between opinion and knowledge; and examine by what measures, in things, whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our assent, and moderate our persuasions.
4. First, I shall inquire into the origin of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them.

5. Secondly, I shall endeavor to show, what knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.
6. Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of faith, or opinion; whereby I mean that assent, which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge: and here we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of assent.
7. If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover the powers thereof, it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop, when it is at the utmost extent ; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things, which are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities.
8. We should not then perhaps be so forward, out of an affectation of an universal knowledge, to raise questions, and perplex ourselves about things, to which our understandings are not suited.
9. If we can find out, how far the understanding can extend its view, we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state.

10. For though the comprehension of our understanding, comes exceedingly short of the vast extent of things...whatsoever is necessary for the conveniences of life, and information of virtue; and has put within the reach of their discovery the comfortably provision for this life and the way that leads to a better.
11. The discoveries we make, we shall then use our understandings right, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion, that they are suited to our faculties...
12. If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things; we shall do muchwhat wisely as he, who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly.
13. ...because some things are not to be understood. Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct. Then, we need not be troubled, that some other things escape our knowledge.
14. Thus men, extending their inquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into those depths, are proper only to continue and increase their doubts.

15. Chapter II - No Innate Principles in the Mind
16. It is an established opinion amongst some men, that there are in the understanding certain innate principles, as it were stamped upon the mind of man, which the soul receives in its very first being; and brings into the world with it.
17. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition.
18. For I imagine anyone will easily grant, that it would be impertinent to suppose, the ideas of colors innate in a creature, to whom God hath given sight...when we may observe in our faculties, fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them.
19. ...This argument, drawn from universal consent, has this misfortune in it, that if it were a true matter of fact, that there were certain truths, wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shown, how men may come to that universal agreement, in the things they do consent in; which I presume may be done.
20. But, which is worse, this argument of universal consent, which is made use of, to prove innate principles, seems to me a demonstration that there are none such, because there are none to which all mankind give universal assent.

21. Gives the example of children and idiots, and writes, of these truths, if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate?
22. ...For a man may live long, and die at last with the ignorance of many truths, which his mind was capable of knowing.
23. For nobody, I think, ever denied that the mind was capable of knowing several truths. The capacity they say, is innate, the knowledge acquired.
24. If they mean that by the use of reason men may discover these principles, then whatever truths reason can certainly discover to us, those are naturally imprinted on the mind...and truths that a rational creature may certainly come to know, if he apply his thoughts rightly that way.
25. Those who will take the pains to reflect with a little attention on the operations of the understanding, will find that this depends not on the use of reason, but on a faculty of the mind distinct from both of them.
26. Reason therefore, would prove them not to be innate.

27. Suggests that we should not assume knowledge of general and abstract truths as innate, till they come to the use of reason.
28. "I allow therefore a necessity, that men should come to the use of reason, before they get the knowledge of those general truths."
29. And therefore, the coming to the use of speech, would be a good proof that they were innate, as to say, they are innate because men assent to them, when they come to the use of reason.
30. "I agree then with these men of innate principles, that there is no knowledge of these general and self-evident maxims in the mind, till it comes to the exercise of reason: but I deny that the coming to the use of reason, is the precise time they are first taken notice of; and, if that were the precise time, I deny that it would prove them innate."
31. The senses at first let in particular ideas: and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory. Afterwards the mind proceeding further, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names.

32. ...since it supposes, that several, who understand and know other things, are ignorant of these principles, till they are proposed to them; and that one may be unacquainted with these truths, till he hears them from others.
33. Then the consequence will be, that a man knows them better, after he has been thus taught them, than he did before.
34. Discusses and implicit knowledge of these principles.

Chapter III - No Innate Practical Principles
35. Those speculative maxims carry their own evidence with them: but moral principles require reasoning and discourse, and some exercise of the mind, to discover the certainty of their truth.
36. It may suffice, that these moral rules are capable of demonstration: and therefore it is our own faults, if we come not to a certain knowledge of them.
37. "Another reason that makes me doubt of any innate practical principles, is, that I think, there cannot be any one moral rule be proposed, whereof a man may not justly demand a reason."

38. I deny not, that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men; and that; from the very first instances of sense and perception, there are some things that they incline to, and others that they let fly: but this makes nothing for innate characters on the mind, which are to be the principles of knowledge, regulating our practice.
39. Another reason which makes me doubt of any innate practical principles, is, that I think, there cannot any one moral rule be proposed, whereof a man may not justly demand a reason: which would be perfectly ridiculous and absurd, if they were innate...He would be thought void of common sense...
40. But yet I think it must be allowed, that several moral rules, may receive from mankind, a very general approbation, without either knowing, or admitting the true ground of morality; which can only be the will and law of a God.
41. It proves not so much, as, that men assent to them inwardly in their own minds, as the inviolable rules of their own practice.
42. To which I amswer, that I doubt not, that men may, by the same way that they come to the knowledge of other things, come to assent to several moral rules, and be convinced of their obligation.

43. Others may also come to be of the same mind, from their education, company, and customs of their country; will serve to set conscience on work, which is nothing else but our opinion or judgement.
44. But I cannot see how many men, should ever transgress those moral rules, with confidence, and serenity, were they innate, and stamped upon their minds.
45. In a part of Asia, the sick, when their case comes to be thought desperate, are carried out and laid on the earth, before they are dead; and left there, exposed to wind and weather, to perish without assistance or pity.
46. Where then are those innate principles, of justice, piety, gratitude, equity, chastity?
47. He that will carefully peruse the history of mankind, and look abroad into the several tribes of men, will be able to satisfy himself, that there is scarce a principle of morality to be named...

48. 'Tis possible, men may sometimes own rules of morality, which, in their private thoughts, they do not believe to be true, only to keep themselves in reputation, and esteem amongst those, who are persuaded of their obligation.
49. But 'tis not to be imagined, that a whole society of men, should cast off a rule which they could not but be infallibly certain, was a law; nor be ignorant, that all men, knew it to be such...who professes himself void of humanity; and one, who confounding the known and natural measures of right and wrong cannot but be looked on, as the professed enemy of their peace and happiness.
50. Whatever practical principle is innate, cannot but be known to everyone, to be just and good.

51. The breaking of a rule, say you, is no argument that it is unknown. But the generally allowed breach of it anywhere, I say, is a proof, that it is not innate.
52. For example, let us take any of these rules, which being the most obvious deductions of human reason, and conformable to the natural inclination of the greatest part of men...
53. Secondly, that it is an innate truth, known to all men, is also false.
54. But what duty is, cannot be understood without a law; nor a law be known, or supposed without a law-maker; so that it is impossible, that this or any other practical principle be imprinted on the mind as a duty, without supposing the ideas of God, of law, of obligation...
55. ...it being impossible, that men should, confidently break a rule, which they could not but evidently know, that God had set up.
56. Without such a knowledge as this, a man can never be certain, that anything is his duty. Ignorance or doubt of the law; hopes to escape the knowledge or power of the law-maker; but let anyone see the fault by it...

57. ...but these are so far from being innate moral principles, that if they were left to their full swing, they would carry men to the overturning of all morality.
58. Moral laws are set as a curb and restraint to these exorbitant desires.
59. There is a great deal of difference between an innate law, and a law of nature; between something imprinted on our minds in their very original, and something that we being ignorant of, may attain to the knowledge of, by the use and due application of our natural faculties.
60. And I think they equally forsake the truth, who running into the contrary extremes, either affirm an innate law, or deny that there is a law, knowable by the light of nature; without the help of positive revelation.
61. ...it will be impossible to find any innate moral rules, by this mark of general assent...since those who talk so confidently of them, are so sparing to tell us, which they are.
62. There could be no more doubt about their number, than there is about the number of our fingers...


1. Though I allow these to be clear truths, and such as, if rightly explained, a rational creature can hardly avoid giving his assent to.
2. Discusses propositions in relation to "those common notions writ on our minds by the finger of God."
3. Therefore, this can be but a very uncertain rule, and is very unfit to be assigned as an innate practical principle.
4. Regarding sins, "we ought to repent, be sorry, and resolve to do so no more."
5. Discusses "when men presuming themselves to be the only masters of right reason, cast by the votes and opinions of the rest of mankind, as not worthy the reckoning."

6. ...For otherwise it will be very hard to understand, how there be some principles, which all men do acknowledge, and agree in; and yet there are none of those principles, which are not depraved by custom, and ill education, blotted out of the minds of many men: which is to say, that all men admit, but yet many men do deny, and dissent from them.
7. I easily grant, that there are great numbers of opinions, which, by men of different countries, educations, and tempers, are received and embraced as first and unquestionable principles, many whereof, both for their absurdity, as well as oppositions one to another, it is impossible should be true.
8. This, however strange it may seem, is that which every day's experience confirms.
9. This will appear very likely, if we consider the nature of mankind; wherein most men cannot live, without employing their time in the daily labors of their calling; nor be at quiet in their minds, without some foundation or principles to rest their thoughts on.
10. There is scarce anyone so floating and superficial in his understanding, who hath not some reverenced proposiions, which are to him the principles on which he bottoms his reasonings; and by which he judgeth of truth and falshood, right and wrong...to take them upon trust.

11. ...it is no wonder, that men should not seriously sit down to examine their own tenets; especially when one of their principles is, that principles ought not to be questioned.
12. And he will be much more afraid to question those principles, when he shall think them, the standards set up by God in his mind, to be the rule and touchstone of all other opinions.
13. When this is done, I shall be ready to embrace such propositions; and till then I may modestly doubt...
14. From what has been said, I think it past doubt, that there are no practical principles wherein all men agree; and therefore none innate.

15. Chapter IV - Other Considerations concerning Innate Principles, both Speculative and Practical
16. Had those, who would persuade us, that there are innate principles, not taken in gross; but considered, separately, the parts would not perhaps, have been so forward to believe they were innate.
17. For if the ideas be not innate, there was a time, when the mind was without those principles; and then, they will not be innate, but be derived from some other original.
18. Of children, writes, "one may perceive how, by degrees, afterwards, ideas come into their minds; and that they get no more, nor no other, than what we experience, and the observation of things, that come their way, furnish them with; which might be enough to satisfy us, that they are not original character, stamped on the mind.
19. Hath a child an idea of impossibility and identity, before it has of white and black, sweet or bitter?
20. ...I would gladly be resolved, whether a man, being a creature, consisting of a soul and body, be the same man, when his body is changed? Whether Euphorbus and Pythagoras, having had the same soul, were the same man, though they lived several ages asunder?

21. For if those innate ideas, are not clear and distinct, so as to be universally known, and naturally agreed on, they cannot be subjects of universal, and undoubted truths; but will be the unavoidable occasion of perpetual uncertainty.
22. Let us examine that principle of mathematics, 'that the whole is bigger than a part.' This, I take it, is reckoned amongst innate principles.
23. If any idea can be imagined innate, the idea of God may, of all others, be thought so; since it is hard to conceive, how there should be innate moral principles, without an innate idea of a Deity: without a notion of a law-maker...
24. There are instances of nations where uncultivated nature has been left to itself, without the help of letter, and discipline, and the improvements of arts and sciences. But there are others to be found, who have enjoyed these in a very great measure, who yet, for want of a due application of their thoughts in this way, want the idea, and knowledge of God.
25. Indeed it is urged, that it is suitable to the goodness of God, to imprint upon the minds of men, characters and notions of himself, and not to leave them in the dark, and doubt, in so grand a concernment; and also by that means, to secure to himself the homage and veneration, due from so intelligent a creature as man; and therefore he has done it.

26. I doubt not but to show that a man by the right use of his natural abilities, may, without any innate principles, attain the knowledge of a God, and other things that concern him.
27. I grant, that if there were any ideas to be found imprinted on the minds of men, we have reason to expect, it should be the notion of his maker, as a mark God set on his own workmanship.
28. He that shall observe in children, the progress whereby their minds attain the knowledge they have, will think, that the objects they do first, and most familiarly converse with, are those that make the first impressions on their understandings.
29. Talk but with [some] people, and you shall find, that though the name of God be frequently in their mouths; yet the notions they apply this name to, are so odd, low, and pitiful, that nobody can imagine, they were taught by a rational man; much less that they were characters writ by the finger of God himself.
30. Whatever idea was never perceived by the mind, was never in the mind. Whatever idea is in the mind, is either an actual perception, or else having been an actual perception, is so in the mind, that by the memory it can be made an actual perception again.

31. Whenever there is the actual perception of an idea without memory, the idea appears perfectly new and unknown before to the understanding.
32. For what is not either actually in view, or in the memory, is in the mind no way at all, and is all one as if it never had been there.
33. ...what is not in the memory, whenever it appears there, appears perfectly new, and unknown before; and what is in the memory, or in the mind, appears not to be new, but the mind finds in in itself, and knows it was there before.
34. To conclude, some ideas forwardly offer themselves to all men's understandings; some sorts of truths result from any ideas, as soon as the mind puts them into propositions: other truths require a train of ideas placed in order, a due comparing of them, and deductions made with attention, before they can be discovered.
35. But the truth is, ideas and notions are no more born with us, than arts and sciences; though some of them, indeed, offer themselves to our faculties more readily than others; and therefore are more generally received.

36. The great difference that is to be found in the notions of mankind is, whilst some taking things upon trust, misemploy their powers of assent; others employing their thoughts only about some few things, grow acquainted sufficiently with them attain great degrees of knowledge in them in the search of other inquiries.
37. Thus, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is a truth, as certain anything can be; there are millions, who know not this at all, because they never set their thoughts on work about such angles, and he that certainly knows this proposition...may be yet utterly ignorant of the truth of other propositions, in mathematics itself...
38. The same may be true for notions we have of the being of a deity.
39. Nor is it a small power it gives one man over another... to serve his purpose...
40. Whereas had they examined the ways, whereby men came to the knowledge of many universal truths, they would have found them to result in the minds of men; and that they were discovered by the application of those faculties, that were fitted by nature to receive and judge of them...

41. Book II - Chapter I - Of Ideas in General, and their Original
42. Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge?
43. To this I answer in one word, from experience: in that, all our knowledge is founded: and from that it ultimately derives itself.
44. "I know it is an opinion, that the soul always thinks."

45. "'Tis doubted whether I thought all last night, or no.'"
46. "But I do say, he cannot think at any time waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it."
47. If the soul doth think in a sleeping man, without being conscious of it, I ask, whether, during such thinking, it has any pleasure or pain, or be capable of misery?
48. Let us suppose that the soul of a man, during his sleep, chooses for its scene of thinking, the body of another man. We have here then, the bodies of two men with only one soul between them.
49. Just by the same reason, they make the soul and the man two persons, who make the soul think apart, what the man is not conscious of.
50. Those, at least, who do at any time sleep without dreaming, can never be convinced, that their thoughts are sometimes for four hours busy without knowing of it...
51. 'Twill perhaps be said, that the soul thinks, even in the soundest sleep, but the memory retains it not.
52. To think often, and never to retain it so much as one moment, is a very useless sort of thinking: and the soul in such a state of thinking, does very little if at all, excel that of a looking-glass, which constantly receives variety of images, or ideas, but retains none; they disappear and vanish, and there remain no footsteps of them; the looking-glass is never the better for such ideas, nor the soul for such thoughts.
53. Perhaps it will be said, that in a waking man, the materials of the body are employed, and made use of, in thinking; and that the memory of thoughts is retained by the impressions that are made on the brain, and the traces there left after such thinking...
54. If it has no memory of its own thoughts; if it cannot lay them up for its use, and be able to recall them upon occasion; if it cannot reflect upon what is past, and make use of former experiences, reasonings, and contemplations, to what purpose does it think?
55. Nature never makes excellent things for mean or no uses: and it is hardly to be conceived, that our infinitely wise Creator, should make so admirable a faculty, as the power of thinking, to be so idly and uselessly employed, at least a fourth part of its time here, as to think constantly, without remembering any of those thoughts, without doing any good to itself or others, or being any way useful to any other part of the creation.

56. Those who so confidently tell us, that the soul always actually thinks, I would they would also tell us, what those ideas are. The dreams of sleeping men, are, as I take it, all made up of waking man's ideas, thoug, for the most part, oddly put together.
57. ...whilst it thinks by itself, the ideas, it is busied about, should be, sometimes at least, those more natural and congenial ones which it had in itself, underived from the body, or its own operations about them.
58. Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind.
59. "I see no reason therefore to believe, that the soul thinks before the senses have furnished it with ideas to think on; so it comes by exercise, to improve its faculty of thinking, thus it increases its stock as well as its facility, in remembering, imagining, reasoning, and other modes of thinking."
60. Suggests that he should make his own hypothesis the rule of nature.

61. Chapter II - Of Simple Ideas
62. Concerning the ideas we have, that some of them are simple, and some complex.
63. Goes on to discuss how ideas come in by different senses.
64. When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas.

65. Chapter III - Of Ideas of One Sense
66. The better to conceive the ideas, we receive from sensation, it may not be amiss for us to consider them, in reference to the different ways, whereby they make approaches to our minds, and make themselves perceivable by us.
67. First, then, there are some, which come into our minds by one sense only.
Secondly, there are others, that convey themselves into the mind by more senses than one.
Thirdly, others that are had from reflection only.
Fourthly, there are some that are suggested to the mind, by all the ways of sensation and reflection.
68. Thus light and colors come in only by the eyese: all kind of noises, sounds, and tones only by the ears: the several tastes and smells, by the nose and palate. Sometimes these are conveyed by their audience to the brain, and perceived by the understanding.
69. Nor indeed is it possible, if we could, there being a great many more of them belonging to most of the senses, than we have names for. The variety of smells, which are as many almost, if not more than species of bodies in the world, do most of them want names.

70. Chapter IV - Of Solidity
71. The idea of solidity we receive by our touch; and it arises from the resistance which we find in body. There is no idea, which we receive more constantly from sensation, thna solidity. Whether we move, or rest, in what posture soever we are, we always feel something under us, that supports us, and hinders us from our sinking downwards.
72. That which thus hinders the approach of two bodies, when they are moving one towards another, I call solidity.
73. "I know not, how men, who have the same idea, under different names, or different ideas, under the same name, can, in that case, talk with one another, any more than a man, who not being blind, or deaf, has distinct ideas of the color of scarlet, and the sound of a trumpet..."

74. Chapter V - Of Simple Ideas of Diverse Senses
75. The ideas we get by more than one sense, are of space, or extension, figure, rest, and motion: for these make perceivable impressions both on the eyes and touch...

76. Chapter VI - Of Simple Ideas of Reflection
77. The mind receiving ideas, when it turns its view inward upon itself, and observes its own actions about those ideas it has, from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation, as any of those it received from foreign things.
78. The two great and principal actions of the mind, are these two: perception, or thinking, and volition, or willing.
79. The power of thinking is called the understanding, and the power of volition is called the will. Of some of the modes of these simple ideas of reflection, such as are remembrance, discerning, reasoning, judging, knowledge, faith, etc.

80. Chapter VII - Of Simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection
81. There be other simple ideas, which convey themselves into the mind, by all the ways of sensation and reflection:
pleasure, or delight, and its opposite.
pain, or uneasiness.
power.
existence.
unity.
82. The first few are rather self-explanatory.
83. Existence and unity, are two other ideas, that are suggested to the understanding...whether a real being, or idea, suggests to the understanding, the idea of unity.
84. Besides, these, there is another idea, and that is the idea of succession.
85. These, if they are not all, are at least the most considerable of those simple ideas which the mind has, and out of which is made all its other knowledge; all which it receives only by the two forementioned ways of sensation and reflection.
86. I grant all this, but desire anyone to assign any simple idea, which is not received from one of those inlets before-mentioned, or any complex idea not made out of those simple ones.


1. Chapter VIII - Some further Considerations concerning our Simple Ideas
2. Considering the simple ideas of sensation 'tis to be considered, that whatsoever is so constituted in nature, as to be able, by affecting our senses, doth thereby produce in the understanding a simple idea.
3. These are two very different things, and carefully to be distinguished; it being one thing to perceive, and know the idea of white or black, and quite another to examine what particles they must be.
4. ...and so to introduce a new idea, which depends only on a different motion of the animal spirits...
5. To discover the nature of our ideas the better, and to discourse them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them.

6. Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call idea; and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call quality of the subject wherein that power is. Thus a snowball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round, the powers to produce those ideas in us, as they are in the snowball, I call qualities; and as they are sensations, or perceptions, in our understandings, I call them ideas.
7. Qualities thus considered in bodies are, first such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in what state soever it be...
8. For example, take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts, each part has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility; divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities: and divide it on, till the parts become insensible, they must retain still each of them all those qualities.
9. For division can never take away either solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from any body...
10. These I call original or primary qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, vis. solidity, extension, figure, motion, or rest, and number.

11. Secondly, such qualities, which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, these I call secondary qualities.
12. The next thing to be considered, is how bodies produce ideas in us, and that is manifestly by impulse, the only way which we can conceive bodies operate in.
13. If then external objects be not united to our minds, 'tis evident, that some motion must be thence continued.
14. Describes the effects of its operations on the stomach and guts.

15. Chapter IX - Of Perception
16. Perception, as it is the first faculty of the mind, exercised about our ideas; so it is the first and simplest idea we have from reflection, and is by some called thinking in general.
17. We are further to consider concerning perception, that the ideas we receive by sensation, are often in grown people altered by judgement and different than in children.
18. For example, when we see before our eyes a round globe, we consider countries, people and geography; but children, however, see it simply as a round ball.
19. But this is not, I think, usual in any of our ideas, but those received by sight: because sight, the most comprehensive of all our senses, conveying to our minds the ideas of light and colors; and also the far different ideas of space, figure, and motion, we bring ourselves by use, to judge of the one by the other.
20. Nor need we wonder, how very quick the actions of the mind are performed.

21. Habits, especially such as are begun very clearly, come, at last, to produce actions in us, which often escape our observation.
22. We may, I think, from the make of an oyster, or cockle, reasonably conclude, that it has not so many, nor so quick senses, as a man, or several other animals; nor if it had, would it be bettered by them. What good would sight and hearing do to a creature, that cannot move itself to, or from the objects, wherein at a distance it perceives good or evil? And would not quickness of sensation, be an inconvenience to an animal, that must lie still, where chance has once placed it; and there receive the afflux of colder or warmer, clean or foul water, as it happens to come to it?
23. Perception then being the first step and degree towards knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it, the fewer senses any man, as well as any other creature, hath; and the fewer and duller the impressions are, that are made by them; and the duller the faculties are, that are employed about them, the more remote they are from that knowledge, which is to be found in some men.
24. It suffices me only to have remarked here, that perception is the first operation of all our intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge into our minds. And I am apt too to imagine, that it is perception in the lowest degree of it, which puts the boundaries between animals, and the inferior ranks of creatures. But this I mention only as my conjecture by the by...

25. Chapter X - Retention
26. The next faculty of the mind, whereby it makes a further progress towards knowledge, is that which I call retention, or the keeping of those simple ideas, which from sensation or reflection it hath received.
27. The other way of retention is the power to revive again in our minds those ideas, which after imprinting have disappeared, or have been as it were laid aside out of sight: and thus we do, when we conceive heat or light, yellow or sweet, the object being removed. This is memory, which as it were the storehouse of our ideas.
28. For the narrow mind of man, not being capable of having many ideas under view and consideration at once, it was necessary to have a repository, to lay up those ideas, which at another time it might have use of.
29. But our ideas being nothing, but actual perceptions in the mind, which cease to be anything, when there is no perception of them, signifies no more but this, that the mind has a power, in many cases, to revive perceptions, which it once had.
30. And in this sense it is, that our ideas are said to be in our memories, when indeed, they are actually nowhere, but only there is an ability in the mind, when it will, to revive them again; and as it were paint them anew on itself, though some with more, some with less difficulty; some more lively, and others more obscurely.

31. And thus it is, by the assistance of this faculty, that we are said to have all those ideas in our understandings, which though we do not actually contemplate, yet we can bring in sight, and make appear again, and be the objects of our thoughts, without the help of those sensible qualities, which first imprinted them there.
32. ...I shall not here inquire, though it may seem probable, that the constitution of the body does sometimes influence the memory; since we oftentimes find a disease quite strip the mind of all its ideas.
33. Concerning the ideas themselves, it is easy to remark, that those that are oftenest refreshed by a frequent return of the objects or actions that produce them, fix themselves best in the memory, and remain clearest and longest there.
34. In this secondary perception, as I may so call it, or viewing again the ideas, that are lodged in the memory, the mind is oftentimes more than barely passive, the appearance of those dormant pictures, depending sometimes on the will.
35. The mind very often sets itself on work in search of some hidden idea, and turns, as it were, the eye of the soul upon it...

36. Memory, in an intellectual creature, is necessary in the next degree of perception. It is of so great moment, that where it is wanting, all the rest of our faculties are in a great measure useless: and we in our thoughts, reasonings, and knowledge, could not proceed beyond present objects, were it not for the assistance of our memories, wherein there may be two defects.
37. First, that it loses the idea quite, and so far it produces perfect ignorance.
38. Secondly, that it moves slowly, and retrieves not the ideas, that it has, and are laid up in store, quick enough to serve the mind upon occasions.
39. The dull man, who loses the opportunity, whilst he is seeking in his mind for those ideas, is not much more happy in his knowledge, than one that is perfectly ignorant.
40. There is another defect, which we may conceive to be in the memory of man in general, that they may have constantly in view the whole scene of all their former actions, wherein no one of the thoughts the ever had, may slip out of their sight.

41. The omniscience of God, who knows all things past, present, and to come, and to whom the thoughts of men's harts always lie open, may satisfy us of the possibility of this.
42. 'Tis reported of that prodigy of parts, Monsieur Pascal, that, till the decay of his health had impaired his memory, he forgot nothing of what he had done, read, or thought in any part of his rational age. But Mr. Pascal was still with the narrowness, that human minds are confined to here...
43. This faculty of laying up, and retaining the ideas, several other animals seem to have, as well as man. Birds learning of tunes, and the endeavors one may observe in them, to hit the notes right, put it past doubt, that they have perception, and retain ideas in their memories, and use them for patterns.
44. ...either whilst the tune was playing, much less after it has ceased, such a motion in the organs of the bird's voice, as should conform it to the notes of a foreign sound, which imitation can be of no use to the bird's preservation.
45. But which is more, it can be supposed that birds, can approach their notes, to a tune played yesterday; which if they have no idea of in their memory, is now nowhere, nor can be a pattern for them to imitate, or which any repeated essays can bring them nearer to. Since there is no reason why the sound of a pipe should leave traces in their brains, which not at first, but by their after-endeavors, should produce like sounds; and why the sounds they make themselves, should not make traces which they should follow, as well as those of the pipe, is impossible to conceive.

46. Chapter XI - Of Discerning, and other Operations of the Mind (page 152 of 726)
47. On this faculty of distinguishing one thing from another, depends the evidence and certainty of several, even very general propositions, which have passed for innate truths...
48. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and allusion, wherein for the most part, lies that entertainment and pleasantry of wit, which strikes so lively on the fancy, and therefore so acceptable to all people; because its beauty appears at first sight, and there is required no labor of thought, to examine what truth or reason there is in it. The mind without looking any further, rests satisfied with the agreeableness of the picture, and the gaiety of the fancy...
49. To the well distinguishing our ideas, it chiefly contributes, they be clear and determinate: and when they are so, it will not breed any confusion or mistake about them.
50. The comparing them one with another, in respect of extent, is another operation of the mind about its ideas.

51. About composition, by adding several units together, we make the idea of a dozen; and putting together the repeated ideas of several perches, we frame that of a furlong.
52. Of idiots and madmen, those who either perceive but dully, or retain the ideas that come into their minds but ill, who cannot readily excite or compound them, will have little matter to think on.
53. Those who cannot distinguish, compare, and abstract, would hardly be able to understand, and make use of language, or judge, or reason to any tolerable degree: but only a little, and imperfectly, about things present, and very familiar to their senses.
54. In fine, the defect in naturals seems to proceed from want of quickness, activity, and motion, in the intellectual faculties, whereby they are deprived of reason: whereas madmen, on the other side, seem to suffer by the other extreme.
55. Thus you shall find a distracted man fancying himself a king, with a right inference, require suitable attendance, respect, and obedience: others who have thought themselves made of glass, have used the caution necessary to preserve such brittle bodies. But there are degrees of madness, as of folly; the disorderly jumbling ideas together, is in some more, and some less.

56. First, because of several of these faculties being exercised at first principally about simple ideas, we might, by following nature in its ordinary method, trace and discover them in their rise, progress, and gradual improvements..
57. And thus I have given a short, and, I think, true history of the first beginnings of human knowledge; whence the mind has its first objects, and by what steps it makes its progress to the laying in, and storing up those ideas...
58. Chapter XII - Of Complex Ideas
59. The acts of the mind wherein it exerts its power over its simple ideas are chiefly these three, 1. combining several simple ideas into one compound one, and thus all complex ideas are made. 2. The second is bringing two ideas, whether simple or complex, together; and setting them by one another, so as to take a view of them at once, without uniting them into one. 3. The third is separating them from all other ideas that accompany them in their real existence; this is called abstraction: and thus all its general ideas are made.
60. As simple ideas exist in several combinations united together; so the mind has a power to consider several of them united together, as one idea.
61. Ideas made up of several simple ones put together, I call complex, such as are beauty, a man, the universe, which though complicated of various simple ideas, yet are, considered each by itself, as one entire thing, and signified by one name.
62. In this faculty of repeating and joining together its ideas, the mind has great power in varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts: but all this still confined to those simple ideas, which are the ultimate materials of all its compositions.
63. For simple ideas are all from things themselves; and of these the mind can have no more, nor other than what are suggested to it.
64. Discusses how elements including the powers of motion, thought, and reasoning, joined to substance, make the ordinary idea of a man.

65. Chapter XIII - Of Simple Modes; and first, of the Simple Modes of Space
66. This power of repeating, or doubling any idea we have of any distance, and adding it to the former as often as we will, without being ever able to come to any stop or sting, gives us the idea of immensity.
67. There is another modification of this idea, which is nothing but the relation which the parts of the termination of extension of space has upon itself.
68. Suggests that much of what we know about space and the universe is a mystery.
69. This the touch discovers in sensible bodies, whose extremities come within our reach...
70. A man may consider light in the Sun, without its heat; or mobility in the body without its extension, without thinking of their separation.

71. If anyone ask me, what this space, I speak of, is?... Or rather, would he not have reason to think, that my design was to make sport with him, rather than seriously to instruct him?
72. If it be demanded whether this space be substance or accident, I shall readily answer, I know not: nor shall be ashamed to own my own ignorance, till they that ask, show me a clear distinct idea.
73. However named or considered, it is always the same uniform simple idea of space, taken from objects, about which our senses have been conversant.
74. The knowing precisely what our words stand for, would, I imagine, quickly end the dispute. I imagine, that men who abstract their thoughts, and do well examine the ideas of their own minds, cannot much differ in thinking; however, they may perplex themselves with words, according to the way of speaking of the several schools or sects they have been bred up in...

75. Chapter XXI - Of Power
76. Another reason why 'tis uneasiness alone determines the will, may be this. Because that alone is present, and 'tis against the nature of things, that what is absent should operate, where it is not.
1. Omitted.
2. Locke discusses the wrong judgments men make.
3. “A man knows what best pleases him, and that he actually prefers.”
4. We deserve “the joys of Heaven offered at once to anyone’s present possession.”
5. “Change but a man’s view of things, let him see, that virtue and religion are necessary to his happiness..."
6. Certain things “come to be represented to our desires, under deceitful appearances." This is related to wrong judgement.”
7. This is also related to pleasure and pain.
8. “The wrong judgement misleads us.”
9. Discusses the term, “antecedent indifferency.”
10. Discusses “motion by thought.”

11. Mentions that some ideas are in relation to other ideas, and that sometimes, relation only exists between two things.
12. Mentions that “there is no one thing, which is not capable of almost an infinite number of considerations.”
13. Then discusses how relations are made up, Chapter XXVI - Of Cause and Effect, and other Relations.
14. In this chapter he also discusses relations of time and place.
15. Then goes on to discuss this in relation to the Creator, or God.
16. “All relations terminate in simple ideas.”
17. In the next chapter discusses “clear and obscure, distinct and confused ideas.”
18. In the next chapter discusses “real and fantastical ideas.”
17. In the next chapter discusses “adequate and inadequate ideas.”
18. In the last chapter, discusses “true and false ideas.”


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